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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Why States Can Tax the GILTI
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage
The most critical weakness of the modern 
corporate income tax is its vulnerability to profit 
shifting, through which corporate taxpayers can 
engage in tax planning to report profits in 
foreign tax havens or low-tax jurisdictions. The 
sweeping 2017 federal tax legislation1 made 
three changes that dramatically affect this 
problem: (1) The federal corporate tax rate was 
reduced from 35 percent to 21 percent; (2) the 
corporate tax base was switched from being 
based on the worldwide income of U.S. 
corporate taxpayers to a territorial system in 
which corporate taxpayers’ foreign income is 
potentially exempt from tax; and (3) new 
antiabuse rules were implemented to combat 
profit shifting, perhaps the most important of 
which is the global intangible low-taxed income 
regime.
GILTI is a new federal tax provision that 
seeks to identify income displaced out of the 
United States by ascertaining whether it was the 
product of an unusually high rate of return. An 
unusually high rate of return is interpreted as a 
proxy indicating that the income in question 
was actually earned somewhere other than 
where it was reported.
We have already argued that states should 
conform to GILTI.2 But might there be 
constitutional restrictions preventing states 
from doing so? In this article, we argue that 
state governments can constitutionally conform 
to the federal GILTI rules and thereby tax GILTI 
income as part of the states’ corporate income 
tax bases. However, in doing so, we explain that 
state governments will need to be attentive to 
background constitutional principles.
A state is permitted to use a reasonable 
formula to approximate how much of a 
multijurisdictional enterprise’s income can be 
fairly apportioned to the state. The burden on 
the taxpayer challenging the formula is then 
heavy, as it must “prove by clear and cogent 
evidence that the income attributed to the State 
is in fact out of all appropriate proportions to 
the business transacted in that State.”3
Darien Shanske is a professor at the 
University of California, Davis, School of Law 
(King Hall), and David Gamage is a professor of 
law at Indiana University Maurer School of 
Law.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives 
on SALT, the authors explain how states can tax 
global intangible low-taxed income.
1
For broader discussion and critique of related aspects of the 2017 
federal tax legislation, see David Kamin et al., “The Games They Will 
Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax 
Legislation,”103 Minn. L. Rev. 1439, 1488-1514 (2019).
2
See Darien Shanske and David Gamage, “Why States Should Tax the 
GILTI,”State Tax Notes, Mar. 4, 2019, p. 751. Our conclusions are 
substantively similar to the excellent analyses of Walter Hellerstein and 
Jon Sedon, “State Corporate Income Tax Consequences of Federal Tax 
Reform,” State Tax Notes, Apr. 16, 2018, p. 187; and Lee A. Sheppard, “Is 
Taxing GILTI Constitutional?” State Tax Notes, July 30, 2018, p. 439. Our 
column is focused on objections to taxing GILTI that have emerged since 
these two articles were written; we also delve further into the details of 
how states can tax GILTI.
3
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1983) 
(internal citations omitted).
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In deciding how much income of a 
conglomerate enterprise a state can subject to its 
formula, the state is limited by the unitary 
business principle.4 Under the unitary business 
principle, states may include the (operational) 
income nominally earned abroad in their 
formula approximations as long as the foreign 
businesses are engaged in a unitary business.5 
Spokespeople for business taxpayers and their 
allies sometimes speak of mandatory 
worldwide combination (and of GILTI 
conformity) as if they were designed to tax 
foreign income.6 But this is inaccurate. Instead, 
what these provisions do is to look to income 
nominally earned elsewhere to arrive at a more 
accurate estimate of income earned in a state.
Up to this point, analysis of GILTI inclusion 
(as well as the repatriation)7 is rather 
straightforward. The primary challenge is 
constructing a reasonable formula. After all, 
even if all GILTI income has been shifted out of 
some other jurisdiction, not necessarily all of 
that income has been shifted out of the United 
States. This raises the question of factor 
representation, which we will address below. 
One thing to note is that the basic constitutional 
rules of apportionment do not dictate how 
foreign factors are to be represented, as long as 
the approach is reasonable. Thus, because the 
whole purpose of GILTI’s calculation rules is to 
ferret out income not produced by the foreign 
assets that the taxpayer claims is responsible for 
them, the foreign income that GILTI identifies 
through these calculations should not be treated 
the same as other foreign income. Accordingly, 
the states should be permitted to use a formula 
other than their standard formula for non-
GILTI foreign income to reasonably determine 
how much of this income should be 
apportioned to the state.
The U.S. Supreme Court has applied these 
background principles to arrive at what is 
effectively this same conclusion in a similar 
context. Consider the facts in Hunt-Wesson v. 
Franchise Tax Board.8 In that case, the Court 
struck down a California rule that ascribed all 
interest expense first to non-unitary businesses. 
The Court held that this rule went too far. 
Nevertheless, the Court understood that 
California had enacted the rule to counter the 
difficulty of ascertaining whether an interest 
expense was actually undertaken to reduce 
income of a California business that would 
otherwise be taxable by the state. Thus, the 
Court went out of its way to bless “ratio-based 
rules” used by the states and the federal 
government in this (interest) context and other 
similar contexts.
As applied to the GILTI question, it seems 
clear that if a ratio-based rule can be used to 
disentangle suspect expenses, such a rule 
should also be permitted for disentangling 
suspect income, including GILTI income.
Kraft v. Iowa, Take 1
Some believe that under Kraft v. Iowa,9 states 
cannot conform to GILTI at all — or, if they can, 
that they can only do so by using an 
apportionment formula that treats GILTI the 
same as the income produced by domestic 
subsidiaries. Kraft is not actually about 
apportionment. The state in Kraft, Iowa, was a 
separate reporting state. Following the federal 
definition of taxable income, Iowa taxed 
dividends received from foreign subsidiaries, 
but not dividends derived from domestic 
subsidiaries. Despite several arguments in favor 
of the Iowa structure, including administrative 
convenience and that this structure does not 
necessarily have any discriminatory impact,10 
the Court struck down the law as facially 
discriminatory against foreign commerce.
4
Allied-Signal v. Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992).
5
Container Corp., 463 U.S. 159; and Barclay’s Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax 
Board, 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
6
Indeed, the very title of the Tax Foundation report on GILTI is 
inaccurate on this score. Jared Walczak, “GILTI Minds: Why Some States 
Want to Tax International Income — And Why They Shouldn’t,” Tax 
Foundation (Jan. 28, 2019).
7
As explained in a prior article, we believe that it is not too late for 
states to do the right thing and tax the repatriation. See Shanske and 
Gamage, “Why (and How) States Should Tax the Repatriation,” State Tax 
Notes, Apr. 23, 2018, p. 317.
8
Hunt-Wesson Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 528 U.S. 458, 467-
468 (2000).
9
Kraft General Foods Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, 505 
U.S. 71 (1992).
10
The Iowa structure clearly did not advantage Iowa businesses. In 
general, Kraft is not a compelling decision, and the dissent by Chief 
Justice William H. Rehnquist (joined by Justice Harry Blackmun) seems 
to get the better of the argument.
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Some leading commentators have argued 
that Kraft established a rule that a state cannot 
treat foreign-source income less favorably than 
domestic-source income.11 Applied to the GILTI 
question, commentators have argued that GILTI 
is foreign-source income and, as such, must be 
apportioned just like domestic-source income, 
or else this would result in impermissible 
discrimination under Kraft.12
However, even before analyzing Kraft 
further, this is a surprisingly prescriptive 
conclusion, and one that runs against the mass 
of precedent that gives states considerable 
leeway in taxing multijurisdictional enterprises 
— leeway that makes sense given the respect 
the states are due as sovereigns trying to 
exercise a core function of revenue-raising.13
Moreover, there are multiple flaws with this 
argument as an interpretation of what Kraft 
demands regarding GILTI income. First, the 
statute in question in Kraft was based on a 
simple binary — the income in question would 
either be subject to tax or exempt. There was 
thus no discussion in Kraft of whether having a 
different apportionment formula for foreign-
source income would be permissible. As we 
have already explained, the general 
constitutional rules governing fair 
apportionment grant the states considerable 
leeway in designing their formulas. So if states 
can apportion the income of financial services 
companies differently and can add back 
suspicious deductions14 or have special water’s-
edge rules for income earned in tax havens — 
none of which has been deemed 
constitutionally problematic — it then seems 
clear that Kraft should not bar states from 
applying some special formula for GILTI 
income, as long as that formula uses a 
reasonable method for approximating how 
much of that income should be apportioned to 
the state.
Second, the Court in Kraft emphasized that 
it was treating the dividends at issue in Kraft as 
foreign-sourced: “The only subsidiary dividend 
payments taxed by Iowa are those reflecting the 
foreign business activity of foreign 
subsidiaries.”15 The Court did not reach the 
question whether it would be constitutional for 
a state to treat some portion of nominally 
foreign earnings as actually earned 
domestically. Again, general constitutional 
principles and the holdings of Container and 
Barclays indicate that states are entitled to use 
nominally foreign income as a reference point 
in their calculations. Furthermore, Hunt-Wesson 
answers the analogous question about 
deductions clearly: States can use a reasonable 
ratio-based rule to apportion deductions that 
the state has good reason to believe are 
misreported.
Kraft v. Iowa, Take 2 — Factor Representation
To summarize our argument so far: States 
can conform to GILTI and, in doing so, can use 
any reasonable formula to disentangle how 
much GILTI income should be apportioned. 
Therefore, the states need not — and as a policy 
matter, should not — use an apportionment 
formula that assumes, in effect, that GILTI 
income is true foreign income, because the 
whole purpose of GILTI is to identify 
misrepresented income, a portion of which was 
actually earned within the United States rather 11
See, e.g., Joseph X. Donovan et al., “State Taxation of GILTI: Policy 
and Constitutional Ramifications,” State Tax Notes, Oct. 22, 2018, p. 315.
12
Id.
13
As the Supreme Court has explained, there is a “strong background 
principle against federal interference with state taxation.” National 
Private Truck Council Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 515 U.S. 582, 589 
(1995).
14
We are focusing our discussion on combined reporting states, as it 
seems odd for a state concerned with income stripping not to start with 
domestic income stripping. Nevertheless, contrary to what many claim, 
we do not think it at all obvious that a separate reporting state cannot 
conform to GILTI. Separate reporting states can and do have addback 
statutes to protect their tax base, so we don’t see why they cannot 
conform to GILTI as a kind of addback statute targeting international 
income shifting.
15
Kraft, 505 U.S. at 77.
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than in the foreign jurisdictions in which it was 
reported to have been earned.
For example, a state might first use some 
reasonable formula for estimating what portion 
of GILTI income was displaced out of the 
United States and then subject that number to a 
domestic apportionment formula for assessing 
how much of that income should be taxed by 
the state. This is our understanding of how New 
Jersey has approached GILTI conformity.16 First, 
New Jersey uses conformity to the 50 percent 
deduction given under IRC section 25017 to 
estimate how much income has been stripped 
out of the U.S. tax base relative to the rest of the 
world.18 New Jersey then uses its share of 
domestic GDP to apportion this estimated 
amount to the state.19
Using an approach like New Jersey’s should 
be constitutionally permissible. But does this 
mean we believe that some foreign-factor 
representation is strictly required? Not 
necessarily, although we do think that some 
reasonable explanation of an approach is 
advisable. In a subsequent article, we plan to 
address whether a state might permissibly go 
further than New Jersey and forgo representing 
foreign factors in the GILTI context.
Conclusion
As we argued in our prior article,20 state 
governments should conform to GILTI because 
it is an effective way to broaden their corporate 
tax bases with relatively little administrative 
burden. In this article, we explained that it is 
clearly constitutionally permissible for state 
governments to conform to GILTI.
In theory, there might be better policy 
alternatives to simply conforming to GILTI. For 
instance, states could implement an improved 
version of GILTI or adopt mandatory 
worldwide combination. However, these 
options would all require more effort in terms 
of design, implementation, and administration. 
We think ease of practical attainability should 
win the day — at least in the short term. We 
urge state governments to incorporate GILTI 
income in their corporate income tax bases. The 
goal of preserving the besieged state corporate 
income tax base requires taking this relatively 
easy opportunity to broaden it, and this 
opportunity is one worth taking. 
16
Shanske has consulted with New Jersey on its approach.
17
We do not think that states must offer the 50 percent deduction on 
federal supremacy grounds. After all, we consider it a close question 
whether the federal government could explicitly require states to levy 
corporate income taxes within certain rate bands; see Gamage and 
Shanske, “The Federal Government’s Power to Restrict State Taxation,” 
State Tax Notes, Aug. 15, 2016, p. 547. By contrast, it is not a close question 
whether a federal government deduction with no mention of the states 
can be interpreted to preempt how states structure their taxing authority. 
Because it is unnecessary that states conform to the IRC section 250 
deduction, we observe that conforming to it can be helpful for building a 
reasonable apportionment method.
18
But why is the 50 percent reasonable? There is evidence that, out of 
the total income shifted out of higher tax jurisdictions, percentages as 
high as 42 percent are shifted out of the United States. Clearly, any first 
cut below 42 percent looks reasonable. A state like New Jersey might 
reasonably choose to go with a slightly higher estimate because: (1) it 
recognizes the limits of these estimates and is seeking to be conservative 
with the public fisc; (2) it recognizes that there will now be more 
incentive for taxpayers to shift income out of the United States as a result 
of the federal-level shift away from taxing worldwide income and that 
the future numbers may be higher; and (3) a relatively high-tax state 
might reasonably believe that income is slightly more likely to be shifted 
out of its tax base as compared to the U.S. average. For these reasons, we 
view New Jersey’s use of 50 percent as a somewhat aggressive, but not 
unreasonable, estimate for how much income has been stripped out of 
the U.S. tax base relative to the rest of the world. 
Alex Cobham and Petr Janský provide evidence for a 37 percent 
share and analyze an IMF team report as providing evidence of a 42 
percent U.S. share. Cobham and Janský, “Global Distribution of Revenue 
Loss From Tax Avoidance: Re-estimation and Country Results,” 30 J. Int’l 
Dev. 206 (2018) (see Table A-2); and Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud De Mooij, and 
Michael Keen, “Base Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing Countries,” 
72 FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis 268 (2016).
19
But is the use of GDP reasonable? We have been surprised that 
there has been such hyperbole from the private bar to the effect that it is 
not.  See Amy Hamilton, “All the Talk: New Jersey’s Unique Method for 
Apportioning GILTI,” State Tax Notes, Feb. 25, 2019, p. 717.  We think it is 
reasonable for a state that uses the single sales factor to expect that, on 
balance, sales in the state should track the economic value created in the 
state.  Other approaches, such as using a taxpayer’s apportionment 
factors without taking GILTI into account, would also be reasonable.  A 
state might opt for the GDP approach on the theory that the ordinary 
sales factor for a taxpayer with GILTI is already compromised, especially 
as to GILTI itself.  Furthermore, the use of GDP in this context is a 
defeasible presumption because of the availability of alternative 
apportionment (not to mention not taking the water’s-edge election).
20
Shanske and Gamage, supra note 2.
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